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FINANCING PEACEKEEPING-TROUBLE AGAIN
For many of the past twenty years financial worries have plagued the
United Nations.' These worries have repeatedly been brought about by
the refusal of member states to pay their assessed share of the cost of

2
maintaining the U.N. peacekeeping forces deployed around the world.
The specter of financial collapse has once again materialized with the
refusal by the Soviet Union, China, Libya, Iraq, and Syria to pay their
portions of the expenses for the United Nations Emergency Force3
(UNEF) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 4
(UNDOF).
UNEF and UNDOF are currently serving as observers and as a "con-

tinuing presence" in the thin buffer zone separating Israel from Egypt,

Jordan, and Syria. 5 They are there at the request of, and with the full
consent of, the nations involved. 6 Nevertheless, the recalcitrant states
contend that the mandate for the two forces is illegal. 7 The problem is not
merely academic; it threatens the continuing viability of the United Nations. Costs for the peacekeeping forces have in some instances totaled
over $10 million per month.' This figure has special significance for the
1. The first major problem involving the financing of peacekeeping forces occurred with
creation of the United Nations Emergency Force at the height of the Suez Crisis in
November 1956. Russell, Development by the United Nations of Rules Relating to
Peacekeeping,59 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 53, 54 (1965); see Slonim, The Advisory Opinion
of the InternationalCourt of Justice on Certain Expenses of the United Nations: A Critical
Analysis, 10 How. L.J. 227, 227-28 (1964). It appears that prior operations were financed
with little difficulty.
2. Firmage, A United Nations Peace Force, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 717, 717-18 (1965).
3. See Assembly Acts on Finances of Peace Forces, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Nov..
1976, at 16; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
4. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force is a subordinate command,
established in 1975, under the control of the UNEF commander.
5. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 44, U.N. Doc. S/11883 (1975), discusses
UNDOF which is serving under UNEF control. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1977, at 7, col.
I.
6. See, e.g., 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) 19, U.N. Doc. S/11759 (1975)
(Israel); 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) 26, U.N. Doc. S/1 1771 (1975) (Egypt). See
also 30 U.N. SCOR (182d mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1832 (1975). Syria, however, has
claimed that the force is allowing Israel to occupy Syrian lands illegally. Thus, its consent is
questionable.
7. See Assembly Acts on Finances of Peace Forces, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Nov.
1976, at 16; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1977, at 7, col. 1. See text accompanying notes 59-65 infra.
8. During the 1960 Congo Crisis, peacekeeping costs reached this level. Franck &
Carey, The Role of the United Nations in the Congo-A Retrospective Perspective, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE CONGO 55 (1962). The deficit created had

.the
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American taxpayer since the United States shoulders up to 40 percent of
the cost of maintaining these forces. 9
The questions raised by this dilemma are both political and legal. They
defy easy answer. This Note will analyze the recalcitrant states' positions
in light of the United Nations Charter and will evaluate the possible
solutions to the U.N.'s financial problems.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
On several prior occasions nations have refused to pay the share of the
cost of maintaining peacekeeping forces 0 apportioned to them by the
General Assembly. The two refusals which are of particular relevance to
the current crisis, and which had the greatest economic impact on the
United Nations, involved the Soviet Union and France."
The first difficulty arose in 1956 with the creation of the United Nations
Emergency Force as a result of the Suez Crisis.' 2 Since the situation
directly involved two of the permanent members of the Security Council,
France and England, and indirectly concerned two others, the United
States and the Soviet Union, effective action by the Security Council was
impossible.' 3 As a result, the General Assembly chose to take action
already reached $284.8 million by 1968. J. LARUS, LIQUIDATING THE UN'S PEACEKEEPING
ARREARS:'A PROPOSAL 17 (Center for International Studies, Policy Paper No. 2, 1968). For
the period from October 1973 to October J975, $159.8 rhillion was authorized, $32.7 million
of which is still owing. Over $10 million was due from members who refused to pay. 30 U.N.
GAOR (Agenda Item 107), U.N. Doc. A/10350, at 3 (1975). The unpaid contributions for the
18 month period ending April 24, 1975 was $49.3 million. Mandate of UN Emergency Force
Extended until July, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, May 1975, at 5.Authorized costs are
currently on the order of $1.3 million per month for UNDOF and $6.7 million per month for
UNEF. 30 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 107), U.N. Doc. A/10350, at 3 (1975); 30 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) 16, 18, U.N. Doc. S/1 1758 (1975).
9. Congress limited the amount the United States could contribute to the U.N. annual
budget to 331/3% in 1952, but the addition of voluntary contributions has brought the United
States share to more than 40%. A. Cox, PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING 120-21 (1967).

Apportionment is now accomplished in accordance with G.A. Res. 3374, 30 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 34) 125, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975), which updates G.A. Res. 3101, 28 U.N.
GAOR, Supp- (No. 30) 122, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
10. The two most famous incidents involved the Congo Crisis and the Suez Crisis, but the
operations in Cyprus and Kashmir also created financial difficulties. A.Cox, supra note 9,
at 116-17.
11. See note 13 infra.
12. J. LARUS, supra note 8, at 3-4; Russell, United Nations Financing and "The Law of
the Charter," 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 68, 73 (1966); see L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED
NATIONS LAW 763 (2d ed. rev. 1967).
13. The largest expenses and greatest difficulties arose with the Russian refusal to pay for
UNEF and ONUC (United Nations Operation-Congo) forces created to handle the Suez
and Congo Crises and the French refusal to pay for ONUC. France distinguished the two
forces on the grounds that ONUC was an armed force and thus only the Security Council
could mandate its use. J. LARUS, supra note 8, at 10-11. France and England joined with
Israel in attacking Egypt after Egypt, in retaliation for the United States refusal to assist in
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through a resolution creating UNEF. 14 Funding for the force was provided through a special account into which members were to pay their
required assessment plus any voluntary contributions. 15 However, the
Soviet Union and a number of smaller countries 16 refused to contribute,
claiming that the Gerieral Assembly was not authorized to create the force
and that the expenses for maintaining the force were not "expenses 7of the
Organization" under Article 17(2) of the United Nations Charter.'
A similar objection was raised when the United Nations OperationCongo (ONUC) was created in 1960 in response to the civil war in the
Congo. The General Assembly attempted to fund the force through normal apportionments to all member states, but the Soviet Union and
France, along with thirteen other states, refused to pay their assessed
shares. 8 The recalcitrant states argued that the Charter gave the Security
Council the exclusive power to act in peacekeeping matters and that the
General Assembly could assess only "regular" or administrative expenses of the Organization under Article 17(2). 19 Eventually, the issue
became so highly contested that over sixty nations were in arrears on
20
required payments.
II
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT DISPUTE
A.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S POWER TO DEAL WITH
PEACEKEEPING MATTERS

Although the Soviet Union continues to pay its share of the costs of the
building the Aswan Dam, nationalized the Suez Canal. The Soviets supported Egypt in this
move. For a general discussion of this conflict, see L. SOHN, supra note 12, at 527-634.
14. G.A. Res. 1000, ES-I U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956).

15. I U.N. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda Item 66) 13, U.N. Doc. A/3383 and Rev.1
(1957); G. ROSNER, THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE 159-61 (1963). In fact the
establishment of this special account, which by distinguishing these expenditures made
them seem "different," may have led to much of the controversy over financing. The
special account has also allowed countries to separate their contributions for peacekeeping
from payments for other IJ.N. expenses and thus has made it possible for them to claim that
they are only refusing to pay for peacekeeping as opposed to other apportioned expenses.
16. Among the nations owing assessments for 1960 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Chile, China, Columbia,'Costa Rica, Cuba, Czecho-

slovakia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.,

U.A.R., Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yemen. G. ROSNER, supra note 15, at 262 n.68.
17. Certain Expenses of the United Nations:Advisory Opinion, 1963 DUKE L.J. 304, 305.
See notes 40-51 infra and accompanying text. For the text of Article 17(2), see note 40 infra.
18. Firmage, supra note 2, at 717.
19. For a full discussion of this issue, see notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
20. By February 1962, 62 nations were in arrears for ONUC expenses. Franck & Carey,
supra note 8, at 55.
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United Nations force needed to police the initial disengagements between
Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel, 2 it refuses to support the force
created by the Second Sinai Agreement which was negotiated by Henry
Kissinger. 2- The Soviets argue that because this agreement was reached
outside of the- United Nations it is therefore not binding on U.N. members. If any agreement is to be binding, they assert, it must be reached
through the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva 23 or through direct
U.N. action. The General Assembly resolutions approving the Second
Sinai Agreement and establishing the funding for UNEF are said to be
beyond the scope of the powers granted to the General Assembly under
the U.N. Charter. 24

The Soviet position is based on a strict construction of Articles 24 and
43 of the Charter. Article 24 confers "on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
.... -"25The Soviets interpret "primary" in the hierarchical sense and
21. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1977, at 7, col. 1.The mandate for the present UNEF force stems
from Security Council Resolution 242, [1967] RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL 8, 22 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF./22/Rev.2, at 8 (1967), and Security Council
Resolution 340, [1973] RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1i,28 U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF./29, at 11 (1973).
22. The present buffer-zone forces in the Sinai Peninsula were created by the 1975
Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Accord which was negotiated by former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger during his highly publicized Middle East "shuttle." N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,
1977, at 7, col. 1.These negotiations were not sponsored by the U.N. Mr. Kissinger acted as
a mediator in the process and brought the two sides together for a bilateral agreement.
23. See, id.; Mandatefor Golan Heights Peace ForceRenewed for Six Months until May
1977, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Dec. 1976, at 24. See generally Security Council Told
Main Elements of Middle East Issue Remain Difficult, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, March
1977, at 14; Assembly Calls for Resumption of Geneva Peace Talks Not Later than March
this Year with PLO Participation, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1977, at 17.
24. The arguments being advanced today to justify the refusal to pay are basically the
same as were advanced 15 years ago. These contentions were rejected by the International
Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962]
I.C.J. 151, but the Soviets and others do not consider an advisory opinion of the Court
binding. The validity of this position is highly questionable. See notes 62-65 infra and
accompanying text. The Soviets have long held this strict view of the functions of the
General Assembly vis-.-vis the Security Council. See 11 U.N. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda
Item 66) 62, 65, U.N. Doc. A/3560 and Add. 1 (1957). A fundamental flaw in the Soviet
position is that UNEF has in fact been in more or less continuous existence since 1956
(though for varying reasons and under different mandates), and thus the Second Sinai
Agreement should not change its validity. Further, the Soviets have been paying for UNEF
forces established by the 1974 agreements, and only refuse to pay for the expansion of the
force under the 1975 agreement. If they believe the entire force is illegal, then their payment
for a part of it is inconsistent with this position.
The United States has stated that it believes the Soviet refusal to pay is illegal because of
General Assembly resolutions approving the Second Sinai Agreement and creating the
peacekeeping force. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. I (emphasis added). Article 24, paragraph 1,provides in
its entirety: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."
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conclude that the provision gives exclusive jurisdiction over security

matters to the Security Council. 26 In support of this view they cite Article
11(2), which authorizes the General Assembly to make recommendations
on questions related to the maintenance of international peace and security, as requiring the General Assembly to refer the question to the Security

Council whenever action is necessary. 27 In addition, the Soviets read
Article 43 as bestowing on the Security Council the exclusive right to

negotiate agreements28for the creation, maintenance, and financing of
peacekeeping forces.
These same arguments were presented to the International Court of
30
29
Justice during the Congo peacekeeping difficulties and were rejected.
The Court, in its opinion on "Certain Expenses of the United Nations,"
held by a vote of nine to five that the assessment of peacekeeping
expenses under Article 17(2) was legal and that the General Assembly
could take action to seek the peaceful settlement of disputes. 3' Specifically, it was held that "primary" in Article 24, when read in its "plain
meaning," implied the existence of a secondary organ with jurisdiction to
deal with peace and security-namely, the General Assembly. 32 Further,
26. Slonim, supra note 1, at 236-37.
27. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United
Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the
United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided
in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the
state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on
which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General
Assembly either before or after discussion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 11, para. 2 (emphasis added).
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 43 provides:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces,
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and
shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
29. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
30. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151.
31. Id. This opinion was adopted by the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 1854, 17 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 54, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). Nevertheless, the Soviets still refused
to pay for the Congo operations.
32. The Court held that "primary" does not mean "exclusive," Advisory Opinion on
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 163, and went on to find the
implication in Article 14 that there is a second competent organ, id.
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the Court found that the "action" referred to in Article 11(2), which was
to be handled exclusively by the Security Council, encompassed only33
enforcement action as envisioned under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Since the prior UNEF and ONUC forces, as well as the present forces,
were established with the consent of the parties to the dispute, 34 they
cannot be considered to be coercive or enforcement forces, and thus the
General Assembly is empowered to deploy them. The Court also judged
the Soviet reading of Article 43 too restrictive since it is not possible to
expect the Security Council to arrange in advance for all expenses of a
peacekeeping force. 35 Finally, Article 5036 was read as contemplating
certain cases where the application of Security Council measures would
require adjustment of the economic burdens of the members, which
3
implied action by the General Assembly under Article 17. 1
The Uniting for Peace Resolution 38 and Article 1439 of the Charter also
lend support to the view that the General Assembly may take steps short
of enforcement action to maintain world peace and security. The Uniting
for Peace Resolution calls for General Assembly action in peacekeeping
when Security Council action is prevented by the veto of a permanent

member. Article 14 empowers the General Assembly to recommend
33. "The word 'action' must mean such action as is solely within the province of the
Security Council . . . . The 'action' which is solely within the province of the Security
Council is that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the Charter, namely 'Action
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.' "Id. at
165.
34. For the text of agreements between the parties, see the sources cited in note 6 supra.
It must be noted, however, that Syria has since claimed that the force is illegal.
35. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 16667.
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 50 provides:
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security
Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which
finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out
of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to
a solution of those problems.
37. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 16667.
38. G.A. Res. 377A, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), This
resolution was one of the first ventures by the General Assembly into the area of peace and
security. It recognizes the right of the General Assembly to consider security matters when
the Security Council is deadlocked. It has proved to be a cornerstone for many subsequent
General Assembly actions.
'39. U.N. CHARTER art. 14 provides:
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it
deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations,
including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present
Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
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measures for the peaceful adjustment of situations which may impair
friendly relations among nations.
B.

EXPENSES OF THE ORGANIZATION

A second and related argument advanced by the Soviet Union is that

the expenses of UNEF are not "expenses of the Organization" as envisioned by Article 17(2) of the Charter.4" According to the Soviets only

the administrative or regular expenses mentioned in Article 17(3) may be
apportioned under Article 17(2).41 The expenses for UNEF, they reason,

are extraordinary rather than administrative and may not be apportioned
by th6 General Assembly.
In light of the decision by the International Court of Justice, this
argument is spurious. There, the Court held that the phrase "expenses of

the Organization" in Article 17(2) did not contain any implied limitation
restricting its operation to administrative or regular expenses. 42 Rather,
the phrase was construed as referring to all costs incurred in carrying out
the purposes of the Organization. The Court thought that if the framers
had wanted to limit Article 17(2) to administrative expenses they would

have so specified as they, did in Article 17(3). 41 Since the maintenance of
international peace and security is a purpose of the United Nations under
Article 1(1), 4 and since the force was created to help maintain peace and
security, the Court reasoned that the costs of the force were within the
scope of Article 17(2).
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 17 provides:
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall
examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to
making recommendations to the agencies concerned.
This argument was also advanced before the I.C.J. in 1962. Advisory Opinion on Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 167-68. It is more complicated now
because the Second Sinai Agreement was not formulated under U.N. auspices.
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 2.
42. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 161.
In reaching its conclusions the Court relied heavily on past U.N. practice. Pharand, Analysis of the Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice on Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, I CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 272, 281 (1963).
43. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 159.
44. U.N. CHARTER art. I provides in pertinent part:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
I. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace. . ..
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In the alternative the Soviets argue that costs for UNEF are not
"expenses of the Organization" because they support a force created
outside of the world organization. 45 They contend that since the present
UNEF received its mandate from the Second Sinai Agreement, and not
through the U.N. or the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva,
members should not now, after the fact,
be required to support a force in
46
whose creation they played no part.
This alternative argument, which comes closest to justifying the Soviet
refusal to pay, has not been previously advanced or litigated. Nevertheless, in light of the International Court of Justice opinion, its validity is
doubtful. There, the Court held that under Article 17(2) the General
Assembly can apportion expenses of the Organization which are in furtherance of United Nations purposes.47 It must be established then that
the cost of the force is an expense of the Organization. The reaction of
the General Assembly to the Second Sinai Agreement is a strong indication that the United Nations feels it is such an expense. While the
Agreement was reached through the mediatory efforts of Mr. Kissinger
and not the United Nations, the U.N. approved the Agreement in resolutions 48 and further resolved to create and fund UNEF under its auspices. 49 These resolutions were passed by a vote of the members under
Article 18 of the Charter. 50 Prior to the passage of the resolutions the
45. The Soviets argue that to be an expense of the Organization, the expense must be
approved before it is incurred. See generally N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1977, at 7, col. 1.
46. See id. The. Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva met only once. The Soviets
have been excluded from the subsequent negotiations outside of Geneva and are demanding
that the Conference be reconvened under joint United States/Soviet chairmanship. The
General Assembly has called for a reconvening of the Conference as well. G.A. Resolutions
61 & 62, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
47. An argument could be made that the force is actually a source of conflict since it is a
constant reminder of the animosity between the two sides. A second argument which a few
of the more radical Arab states might support is that the presence of the force is only
prolonging the controversy and that only an armed-conflict will bring about a final solution.
Such arguments, however, would probably find few adherents.
48. See 30 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2368, at 22-26 (1975) (comments of Israeli
representative); S.C. Resolutions 371, 378 & 381, [1975] RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL 6, 7, 30 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF./3 1, at 6, 7 (1975) (renewing

mandates of UNEF and UNDOF). For the text of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel,
see 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) 54, U.N. Doc. S/11818/Add.I (1975).
49. G.A. Res. 3374, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 124, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); G.A.
Res. 3211 B, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 120, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 3101,
28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 122, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 18 provides:

I. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting ....
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional
categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a
majority of the members present and voting.
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Soviet Union and the other dissatisfied states had ample opportunity to
state their position, voice their objections, and try to convince the members of the correctness of their position. Once the vote is taken, however,
they are bound by the decision of the majority. 5' The majority vote for
the acceptance of the Second Sinai Agreement and the force it created
brought the Agreement within the ambit of a decision by the Organization
and thus expenses arising out of this decision are covered by Article
17(2).
C.

PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS OF

UNEF

It may be argued that UNEF is not a mere peacekeeping or observer
force but is more in the nature of an enforcement action under Chapter
VII of the Charter, which is in the exclusive province of the Security
Council.5 2 This argument would be based not only on the fact that the
force is armed, but also on the force's extensive use of surveillance and
53
reconnaissance.
Such an argument is easily countered, both by precedent and by the
Charter. The International Court of Justice characterized the United
Nations operation in the Congo as a peacekeeping operation.5 4 That
action involved far more troops, considerably more fighting, and much
greater military involvement than the current UNEF operation. Traditionally, peacekeeping forces have been characterized by the agreement
55
of the two parties to their presence. Such agreement is present here.
Enforcement actions, on the other hand, require no agreements and no
invitations.56 Finally, under Article 22 of the Charter "[t]he General
Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for
the performance of its functions." 57 Since one of its functions under
Article 11(2) is to make recommendations on the maintenance of peace,58
it may establish a subsidiary force to observe or to implement and facilitate its recommendation.
51. Cf. Russell, supra note 12, at 83 n.29 (comparing the effect of U.N. General Assembly majority voting with that of the League of Nations unanimity requirement).
52. Articles 41 and 42 provide a partial listing of the measures that may be taken by the
Security Council upon a finding of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression" under Article 39. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41 & 42.
53. The force has set up early warning systems in the Sinai utilizing radar, electronic
surveillance and hearing devices, and reconnaissance flights and has made the information
available to both sides. See 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 44, 45, U.N. Doc.
S/11883 (1975); 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) 16, 17, U.N. Doc. S/11758 (1975).
54. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151. For a
good discussion of the distinction between the settlement activities of a peacekeeping force
and U.N. enforcement actions, see Russell, supra note 1, at 54-56.
55. Syria, however, has seemingly withdrawn its approval. For the text of agreements
between the parties to the dispute, see the sources cited in note 6 supra.
56. This proposition is clearly mandated by Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 22.
58. For the text of U.N. Charter article 11, paragraph 2, see note 27 supra.
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D.

OTHER ARGUMENTS

China, Iraq, Libya, and Syria claim that the "Zionist aggressors"
should pay the entire cost of maintaining the peacekeeping forces. 59 In
short, they believe that Israel has caused the problem and thus should pay
for it. There is no authority which supports this argument and it seems to
be based solely on ideological and political grounds. There are clearly
severe difficulties with such a position. First, there is the obvious problem of ascertaining which party was the true aggressor. Further, nothing
in the Charter requires payment by the aggressor even if it can be named;
apportionment is left to the discretion of the General Assembly under
Article 17(2).
Syria also argues that it is unfair to expect it to help maintain a force
which it believes is allowing Israel to illegally retain Syrian territory
captured during the warA0 However, it must be remembered that in June
1974 when the agreement creating the peacekeeping forces was created
both Syria and Israel agreed to the positioning of U.N. troops along their
borders. 61 Although Syria may call the validity of the force into question,
the International Court of Justice opinion would indicate that it is still
bound to pay its apportioned costs until the force is removed by General
Assembly action.
The final argument presented by the Soviets and the other recalcitrant
nations is that the General Assembly may only make recommendations on
peace and security under Article 11, and that any resolutions passed by
the General Assembly are only recommendatory under Article 10.62 They
argue that these resolutions cannot create binding legal obligations for the
member states of the Organization. In the past it has generally been
assumed that General Assembly resolutions carry only political and moral
force and are not binding.6 3 The International Court of Justice in its
59. Assembly Acts on Finances of PeaceForces, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Nov. 1976,
at 16. The Soviets have long believed that the parties responsible for the crisis should bear
the entire cost. See I1 U.N. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda Item 66) 62, 65, U.N. Doc. A/3560
and Add. 1 (1957); Comment, InternationalLaw-The United Nations Emergency ForceLegal Status, 57 MICH. L. REV. 56, 78-79 (1958).
60. See Assembly Acts on Finances of Peace Forces, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Nov.
1976, at 16.
61. See the documents cited in notes 6 & 49 supra.
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 10 provides:
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope
of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs
provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council
or to both on any such questions or matters.
63. Slonim, supra note I, at 247. See also Note, Security CouncilResolutions: When Do
They Give Rise to Enforceable Legal Rights? The United Nations Charter,the Byrd Amendment and a Self-Executing Treaty Analysis, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 298, 298 n. I (1976).
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interpretation of Article 17(2) seems to have considered resolutions as
having more power than that. It is now at least arguable that while
General Assembly resolutions initiating actions may only be recommendatory, the financial resolution passed pursuant to Article 17(2),
which finances the action, is obligatory. 64 This seemingly anomalous
result arises from the independent authority of the General Assembly to
apportion expenses. Thus, although a member may not agree with certain
actions by the Assembly, it must still finance them. This would, in fact if
not in theory, seem to make resolutions binding. Further, while it is true
that the Court opinion was6 5only advisory, the General Assembly adopted
the opinion by resolution.
III
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The present controversy surrounding the financing of peacekeeping
stems from differing views of the Soviet Union and the United States on
the proper function of the United Nations in the world. The Soviet view
of the U.N. is much more limited than that of the United States. The
Soviets tend to be restrictive when analyzing U.N. powers, using a very
strict construction of the Charter.6 This attitude is illustrated by their
attempts to limit expenses under Article 17(2) to administrative operations and to restrict the General Assembly's power in peacekeeping
functions. They seem to view the U.N. not as a world government but as
a permanent forum where sovereign states may meet and discuss their
differences. The Soviets are suspicious of, if not hostile to, any attempt
to increase the power of the United Nations with respect to the individual
states.
The United States, on the other hand, views the Charter expansively.67
It tends to be more willing to give the U.N. some real power even at the
expense of its own sovereignty in the belief that the U.N. should be
something of an international government.'
64. Slonim, supra note 1, at 247. The author realizes that this argument is almost circular.
Practice and the I.C.J. opinion, however, seem to support it.
65. G.A. Res. 1854, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 54, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
66. Examples of Soviet actions where they have sought to restrict U.N. action are: The
Greek Question, The Hyderabad Question, The Korean Question, and The Hungarian
Question. See generally L. SOHN, supra note 12, at 321-52, 393-416, 474-90, 634-80. This
position seems to be gradually shifting in recent years as the U.N. membership becomes
increasingly sympathetic to Soviet policies. Thus, the restrictive policies of the Soviets may
have been more of a defensive technique than a true ideological belief.

67. Examples of this attitude are American support for the Uniting for Peace Resolution

and heavy United States funding of all peacekeeping forces.
68. This is not to say that the United States is willing to follow the will of the majority in

all situations. Examples of American refusals to abide by majority views are The China
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Although there is great divergency between the two views there are
certain basic policies upon which both countries would seemingly agree.
Among these is that the United Nations should perform some role in
conflict resolution. There is, of course, controversy on how this can best
be accomplished. Since the Soviets have supported some of the
peacekeeping forces, 69 however, they would presumably admit that in
some instances such forces are the only practical way to bring about
peace.
While it is fine to discuss the legal aspects of peacekeeping and the
philosophy underlying United Nations actions, it must be remembered
that politics play an important role in peacekeeping decisions. At least
one superpower has had a political interest in each of the peacekeeping
decisions made to date. 70 Power politics is still a very important factor in
international relations. Thus, it must be realized that despite all of the
supposed legal justifications for refusing to pay expenses, the bottom line
may simply be that it is not in the political interest of a state to pay. Since
U.N. power to force compliance is usually limited to moral force, perhaps
the only realistic solution is to give the U.N. a measure of independence
which would allow it to act without the support of a particular superpower
in a given circumstance.
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
One possible solution to the problem is action against the member in
arrears under Article 19 of the Charter. 71 This Article calls for the loss of
voting rights in the General Assembly when the amount in arrears equals
the contributions due from the member for the preceding two years. This
is undoubtedly the strongest sanction available and its invocation would
certainly discourage some countries from falling behind in payments, but
Question, The Israel Question, and The South African Question. As the Western majority in
the U.N. has eroded in recent years, so has the liberal attitude of the United States. Thus,
the American attitude could also be self-serving.
69. The Soviets have supported operations in Greece, Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir, and
Yemen, among others. A. Cox, supra note 9, at. 155-60.
70. Although at times the analysis does not hold (for example, the conflict in Kashmir), it

appears that in most instances an "East-West" confrontation has been involved (for
instance, the conflicts involving Indonesia, Cyprus, the Congo, and Palestine).
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 19 provides:

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears inthe payment of its financial

contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the

amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it
for the preceeding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit

such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions
beyond the control of the Member.
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its use against a powerful nation such as the Soviet Union is impractical. 72
The loss of a vote in the General Assembly would have little effect on a
permanent member of the Security Council since the member would still
retain its veto power in that organ. Further, while it would lose its own
vote, the effect of a world power would still be felt in the General
Assembly through its influence over alligned countries. Most importantly, removal of the vote from a permanent member of the Security
Council could lead to its withdrawal from the U.N. resulting in a total
collapse of the world organization. Finally, the removal of the vote does
not place money in the U.N. coffers and solve the financial problem.
Thus, while Article 19 is the most severe sanction and should be considered as a possible remedy especially against smaller nations, its enforcement against one of the superpowers is unrealistic.
A second and more promising recommendation is to require all members to contribute to a separate peacekeeping fund each year whether or
not peacekeeping operations are then in progress. 73 This plan has many
advantages. Foremost among these is that it helps remove the problem of
financing peacekeeping from the political arena. In the past whenever a
country has refused to pay peacekeeping costs, the contributions have
been for a force to which it was politically opposed. This recommendation would preclude such difficulties by collecting funds for the
force before the particular dispute arose. It also would create a reserve
which would be immediately available for the financing of operations,
thus avoiding the time lag involved in accumulating the funds as the need
arises. 74 Finally, the system would allow for a large monetary reserve
upon which interest could be accumulating, thus further strengthening the
U.N. financial position. While it is true that some states may be reluctant
to follow this recommendation because it would "give the U.N. too much
power," and while it is also true that there is some risk of the General
Assembly becoming irresponsible in setting up peacekeeping forces,
these drawbacks are outweighed by the advantages such a recommendation offers.
A third alternative is to develop a system of weighted voting on budget72. The United States argued strongly at one time for the application of the Article 19
sanction against the Soviets. Russell, supra note 12, at 68-69. The United States still
believes in the Article in principle, but now realizes that practical considerations mitigate
against enforcement. 19 U.N. GAOR, Special Committee Peacekeeping Operations 7-10,
U.N. Doc. AIAC.121/PV.15 (1965).
73. Cf. Fine, Peace-Keeping Costs and Article 19 of the UN Charter:an Invitation to
Responsibility, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 529, 536-39 (1966) (proposing plan for mandatory
retroactive assessment in conjunction with presubscription assessment of peacekeeping
costs).
74. For example, U.N. contributions become due on January 1 of each year. The United
States, however, funds on a fiscal year. Money usually does not become available for its
contribution until June or later. The United States is thus habitually six months in arrears.
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ary matters. 75 A very large portion of the controversy centers around how
expenses are apportioned among the member states. Large countries
often find themselves carrying the largest share of the expenses but still
having only an equal voice with smaller, poorer countries. Apportionment
has traditionally been based on ability to pay and is tied closely to a
country's gross national product. 76 Hence, large countries are forced to
support what they often consider to be rash decisions of nations who
furnish little or none of the support. A weighted voting system should not
have the effect of putting the veto power into the General Assembly.
Voting weight need not be exactly proportional to economic power.
Finally, it must be emphasized that such a weighted system should only
be used when voting on financial matters. If weighted properly, it would
not give ultimate control of the General Assembly to the larger states or
upset the balance of power. Such a solution is of course not without
difficulties. Poorer countries will undoubtedly be extremely reluctant to
give up even a small part of their power in the General Assembly.
Further, this alternative would require an amendment to the Charter
which is certainly no easy task.
Two final suggestions may be useful in solving the immediate problem.
The first, and perhaps easiest to implement immediately, is to insure that
the Soviets participate in any further negotiations concerning the Middle
East. This will satisfy them at least temporarily and will start sorely
needed funds flowing into the U.N. coffers. Second, world opinion must
be focused against the recalcitrant states. The news media should be
employed to inform the public that political nuances are being used to
avoid financial responsibilities and that this avoidance is a direct threat to
everyone's peace and security.
CONCLUSION
The continuing financial viability of the United Nations has been repeatedly threatened by member states' refusal to accept their responsibilities to finance peacekeeping forces. While it appears that the actions
of these states are without legal basis, the problem still continues. The
adoption of weighted voting and the creation of a permanent separate
peacekeeping fund requiring annual contributions would go a long way
toward solving these problems. The stakes are high-world peace hangs
in the balance.
John Robert Cotton
75. Jackson, The Legal Framework of United Nations Financing:Peacekeeping and
Penury, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 127 (1963).
76. See Bleicher, Financing Peacekeeping from IMF and IBRD Income, 42 WASH. L.
REV. 1017, 1062-64 (1967).

